Research

Richard Harrison · William Scheela · P. C. Lai · Sivapalan Vivekarajah ·Asia Pacific Journal of Management ·2018

Emerging economies are characterized by the presence of institutional voids which challenge and constrain the behavior of economic agents. In this paper we report on one set of agents, angel investors, in Malaysia, which investors fear is experiencing a middle-income trap whereby economic growth and new venture formation stalls due to persistent institutional voids. This research addresses this question through interviews with 19 Malaysian business angel investors in 2015, utilizing a mixed-methods approach. Results indicate that business angels in our sample generated strong returns, though they did find it a challenge to invest in and monitor new ventures in a highly uncertain and competitive environment where there is high political uncertainty, weak legal and financial support for investors and SMEs. In order to overcome weak institutional support, business angel investors develop informal institutions by co-investing and networking with family members and government officials. They also conduct careful due diligence before investing and closely monitor their investee companies after investing. This research provides several theory and practice contributions with respect to business-angel investing in emerging economies with weak formal institutional regimes.

Kunal Sen · Matthew Tyce ·Structural Change and Economic Dynamics ·2019

Both Malaysia and Thailand were seen to be part of the miracle growth economies of East Asia and fast moving into high income status in the early 1990s. Following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of the mid 1990s, both countries have observed prolonged growth slowdowns. In this paper, we offer a political economy explanation of the growth slowdown in Malaysia and Thailand in their post AFC phases. We argue that the nature of the political settlement in these two countries determined a growth strategy that was predicated on offering open deals in the export-oriented manufacturing sector that were accessible to most firms, while at the same time, offering closed deals to politically connected firms in the natural resource and services sectors. As the political settlement moved to a vulnerable authoritarian one in both countries, such a dualistic deals strategy became patronage based over time and detrimental to growth.